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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between performance-based CEO compensation and 
earnings management by French managers. The French context is worthy to study given that firms are mostly 
held by families. CEO compensation in such firms is used as a tunneling mechanism to expropriate minority 
shareholders. Using a sample of French listed firms, we study how bonuses and CEO stock-option compensation 
affect earnings management practices. The findings show that managers are inclined to increase the variable part 
of their compensation by engaging in earnings management practices. Furthermore, we find that the amount of 
stock-options granted and exercised is positively associated to upward earnings management. These findings 
highlight manager’s opportunistic behaviour upon performance-based compensation which rather acts as a 
tunnelling mechanism than a corporate governance device. 
Keywords: Stock-option, Bonus, Earnings management 
 
1. Introduction 
The issue of executive compensation has been the subject of much debate by several regulators. The growing 
attention to this incentive mechanism also attracted the attention of many researchers by examining the 
legitimacy of compensation granted to executives. Research on executive compensation is supported by the 
agency theory framework (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The separation between decision and ownership leads to 
conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers. The latter take advantage of their strategic position and 
managerial latitude to pursue their own goals rather than those of shareholders. To address this problem and 
reduce the agency costs, corporate governance incentive and control mechanisms are introduced to protect the 
interests of shareholders. The incentive mechanisms mainly include contracts pay between owners and managers.  
While executive compensation is deemed to align the interests of executives and shareholders, it may lead 
however, to significant deviations. Indeed, the financial scandals of recent years and the growth of compensation 
plans reveal that managers enjoy significant financial benefits even when their firm performance is poor. This is 
due to the ability of managers to change the settings of their earnings by taking advantage of their power in the 
firm. 
Earnings management is supported by the framework of positive accounting theory (or contractual political 
theory) initiated by Watts and Zimmerman (1978). The choice of accounting policies reflects the contractual 
relations and informational advantage of managers. A key assumption arising from the nature of contracts is the 
assumption of compensation developed by Watts and Zimmerman (1978). 
Executives are inclined to profit from accounting deficiencies to influence the content of firm financial 
statements for their own interests. From an opportunistic perspective, managers use their discretion to increase 
their compensation depending both on accounting performance (bonus) and market value (stock-options). This 
opportunistic behaviour by managers may result in earnings management practices.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between pay for performance and earnings management 
by French managers. This study aims at shedding light on this relationship in a different legal and financial 
environment which is the French context. The French context is worthy to study given that firms are mostly held 
by families. CEO compensation in such firms is used as a tunneling mechanism to expropriate minority 
shareholders. 
Our findings show that managers are inclined to increase the variable part of their compensation by engaging in 
earnings management practices. Furthermore, we find that the amount of stock-options granted and exercised is 
positively associated to upward earnings management. These findings highlight manager’s opportunistic 
behaviour upon performance-based compensation which rather acts as a tunnelling mechanism than a corporate 
governance device. 
This paper is organized as follows: the second section presents a review of the literature on the link between 
executive compensation and earnings management. The third section presents the procedure of sample selection, 
data collection methodology and empirical results. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses  
Two basic approaches explain the process of determining executive compensation, developed in the framework 
of the theory of agency: the approach of the optimal contract "Optimal Contracting" and the managerial power 
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approach "Managerial Power ". The approach of the optimal contract (Gossman and Hart, 1983) predicts that the 
board designs executive compensation arrangements exclusively to reduce agency costs. However, the theory of 
managerial power indicates that managers have considerable power over the board, enabling them to affect the 
process of fixing their compensation, in order to obtain the highest possible compensation (Core et al. 2003). 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) point out that executive compensation is not considered only as a potential tool for 
alignment of interests, but rather a part of the agency problem itself. Managers use this corporate governance 
device as a tunneling mechanism to extract "rents", through earnings management practices. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) assume that managers are opportunists and select the accounting practices 
allowing them to maximize their own utility. According to the politico- contractual theory, CEO compensation 
contracts, is a motivation for earnings management. Hence, managers can choose ex-post accounting methods 
that allow them to artificially inflate the profits of their company in order to maximize their wealth. 
2.1. Bonus and earnings management  
Bonus granted to executives is linked to performance measures, such as the accounting profit. According to 
Ittner et al. (2003), earnings per share, net income, and operating income are the most commonly used 
performance measures. Murphy (2001) found that 91% of firms in their sample, adopt accounting performance 
measures in their bonus plans.  
Through the bonus level hypothesis, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that managers that benefit from bonus 
plans based on accounting income are more likely to choose accounting practices that defer the profits of future 
periods to the current period in order to maximize the variable part of their compensation. 
Empirically, Healy (1985) show that managers use discretionary accruals to maximize the value of their bonuses 
plans. Gaver et al. (1995) use a sample of 102 firms from 1980 to 1990 and show that managers are able to 
manage the results of their firm to maintain their bonus at a constant level. Balsam (1998) also find a positive 
relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings management. While Holthaussen et al. (1995) find non-
significant results among this relationship.  
More recently, the accounting literature has focused on the impact of various forms of compensation including 
bonus plans. Cheng and Warfield (2005) show that when the bonus is indexed to outcomes, managers 
manipulate their earnings to receive the bonus. Moreover, El Mir and Seboui (2007) conduct a study on a sample 
of 612 French companies, their findings show a positive impact of variable compensation on opportunistic 
behaviour of managers, proxied by discretionary accruals . 
The preceding discussion document that managers are likely to use upward discretionary accruals to maximize 
the value of their bonuses. Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
 H1: Bonuses have a positive effect on earnings management. 
2.2. Stock-options and earnings management 
Stock-options are one specific form of manager’s pay. This compensation feature is related to a firm’s financial 
performance, the reason why they attracted the attention of many researches in the economic literature.  
Investors on the financial markets use accounting information to infer the future prospects and the value of their 
firm. The rationale on the use of stock-option plan as a part of CEO compensation is the agency theory (1976). 
This pay for performance is used by shareholder’s to align their interests with those of managers and reduce 
manager’s opportunism. By so doing, their objective is to maximise the value of their firm. The relationship 
stock-option compensation and earnings management is supported by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) arguing that 
managerial opportunism is exacerbated by such form of compensation. Indeed, managers use this pay for 
performance to maximise their own utility function by selecting accounting methods that enhance firm 
performance leading to better stock price assessment. 
Accordingly, the relationship between stock-option compensation and earnings management is based on the 
assumption that accounting practices are likely to influence stock prices. Cheng and Warfield (2005) argue that 
earnings management is likely to be associated with firm value only if: (i) investors rely on accounting 
information to assess the firm’s value. (ii) Managers can take advantage of stock prices’ increase through their 
stock-options. According to Jensen (2001), the only way available to managers to enhance firm value on the 
market is "to cook numbers" to mask the inherent uncertainty in the activity of their firm. 
Empirically, previous studies have examined the relationship between stock-options and the likelihood of 
reporting erroneous reports and have found a positive relationship. Johnson et al. (2003) show that firms that are 
granting a large amount of stock-options to their managers are those which are committing fraud in their 
accounting numbers.  Similarly, Burns and Kedia (2006) find that stock-options in comparison to other 
components of CEO compensation are related to earnings management practices. Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) find that firms with Stock-option executive plans are likely to use discretionary accruals to make high 
profits. 
More recently, in the American context, Chen and Li (2011) find that CEO executive compensation indexed on 
firm performance is positively related to discretionary accruals. Based on a sample of Australian firms, Sun and 
Hovey (2012) also find that earnings management and stock-option based compensation are significantly 
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associated.  
Managers are trying to maximize their wealth on behalf of their compensation indexed to equity prices. This 
encourages them to engage in earnings management to control the profits of their firms and keep stock prices 
high in the short term (Efendi et al. 2007). Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 H2: Stock-option Compensation has a positive impact on earnings management. 
2.2.1 Stock-option attribution and earnings management 
Stock-options are generally granted at the money (the exercise price equals to the market price). The option 
exercise price is the price at which managers can buy shares in their company, so the value of the options can be 
increased by temporarily reducing the price of the underlying shares immediately before the date of the granting 
of options (Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001). 
Previous studies have documented that managers use several strategies to increase the value of their stock-
options around the date of grant. Yermack (1997) shows that managers influence in an opportunistic manner 
remuneration, by manipulating the timing of obtaining stock-options to occur just before (after) the disclosure of 
good (bad) news. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) show that managers accelerate the release of bad news ahead of 
predetermined options grant dates. Moreover, Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) examine the cumulative abnormal 
returns before the attribution of options. These authors suggest that managers benefit from lower stock price 
prior to the stock-option attribution, and an increase in stock prices after the date of grant.  
These evidences led Balsam et al. (2003) to question whether managers affect the benefit of their firm to cause a 
decline in stock prices on the date of grant. These authors find a negative association between discretionary 
accruals and the attribution of new stock-options. Baker et al. (2003) also find that a high attribution of stock-
options during a year is related to downward earnings management. This link can be amplified if the managers 
have the opportunity to publicly announce the results immediately preceding the date of grant.  
In light of this discussion, we assume that managers manage earnings downwardly to decrease stock prices 
around the attribution date of options in order to book a higher income in the following fiscal year. Our 
hypothesis is then as follows:  
H 2a : Periods of new stock-options attribution is related with downward earnings management. 
2.2.2 Stock-option exercise and earnings management: 
Another stream of research examines the relationship between earnings management and the exercise of stock-
options. Bartov and Mohanram (2004) find evidence in concordance with the timing hypothesis. The authors 
argue that managers use their private information to determine the date of their stock-option exercise. Bartov and 
Mohanram (2004) test whether managers inflate the result of their firm during stock-options exercise periods. 
They find that periods of " pre-exercise " are characterized by a large discretionary accruals level of increasing 
earnings to increase their gain from the exercise of stock-options and the sale of the shares acquired. They also 
find that poor earnings are released in the " post-exercise " period. 
Johnson et al. (2003) and Cheng and Warfield (2005) examine the behaviour of earnings management before the 
exercise of stock-options. They show evidence of a positive association between the exercise of options and 
earnings management. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that during periods characterized by an increased 
use of discretionary accruals, managers exert an unusual amount of options. In addition, Burns and Kedia (2008) 
find that firms adopting aggressive accounting practices have significantly more options. They show that the 
exercise of options is higher by 20-60% compared to similar firms (selected according to the criteria of industry 
and size) with no adjusted earnings. 
Accordingly, we assume that managers use discretionary accruals to increase the stock price around the date of 
exercise of options.  
H2b : The exercise of stock-options periods coincides with upward earnings management. 
 
3. Sample selection and methodology 
3.1. Sample and data 
Our sample includes French companies listed on the SBF 120 index over a period from 2006 to 2008. We 
remove from our initial sample financial institutions (banks, insurance and finance companies) due to the 
specificity of their financial statements. In addition, we exclude firms for which some data are not available or 
which are not listed during the studied period. 
Table 1. Sample selection procedure 
 Number 
SBF 120 firms 120 
- Financial companies 18 
- Companies with unavailable data 25 
= Final sample 77 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.13, 2014 
 
52 
 
Data related to executive compensation were hand-collected from annual reports downloaded from AMF 
(Autorité des Marchés Financiers) website. As for accounting and financial data, they were extracted from the 
Thomson One Banker database.  
3.2. Variables measurement 
3.2.1 The dependent variable : Earnings management 
Earnings management is measured by discretionary accruals since we test the effect of executuive 
comopensation on the direction of earnings management rather than the magnitude of the latter. We estimate 
discretionary accrual using the models of "Jones modified" (Dechow et al, 1995), 
  TAi,t/Ai,t-1 = α1 (1/Ait-1) + α2 (∆Saleit – ∆receivablesit/ Ait-1) +       α3 (PPEit/ Ait-1)+ εi,t  
Avec: 
TAi,t     : Total accruals of firm i in year t. 
Ai,t-1     : Total assets  of firm i in the beginning of year t.  
∆ Salei t  : Sale variation   
∆receivablesit : Total receivables variation 
PPEit    : Gross tangible assets  
εi,t        : The estimated discretionary accruals 
3.2.2 Independent variables  
We test the effect of variable compensation (bonus) and stock-option compensation on earnings management 
practices.  
-Bonus: This variable is measured by the value of the bonus granted to directors during the year. 
-Stock-option compensation: We use three measures for stock-option compensation.  
 The number of options possessed by managers at the end of the year divided by to social capital in terms of the 
number of shares for the same year. This measure was used by Burns and Kedia (2006). 
 The attribution of new options: The value of newly granted options is measured by the following version of 
Black and Scholes ( 1973) : 
 
C (Pt , P0 , t) = Pt e
- δ t N(d1) – P0 e
- r t N(d2). 
With : Pt : Stock price. P0 : Exercise price. δ : Expected dividend value. r : risk free rate. t : The remaining time 
to maturity. N: the cumulative probability function of a normal distribution.  
d1 =  [ ln ( P1 / P0) + (r – δ + 1/2σ
2) × t)]  / [δ - √ t] . 
                   d2 = d1 – σ × √ t . 
The exercise of options:  The intrinsic value of options exercised are equal to the difference between the exercise 
price and the value of the underlying stock. Here we retain the share price recorded at December 31th of the year 
t. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
Firm size: The political costs hypothesis formulated by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) states that large firms are 
subject to a tough monitoring by the market. However, several researchers show that large companies are 
involved with earnings management practices (Chung et al. (2002) and Yang et al. (2008)). We do not expect 
then the direction of the relationship between firm size and earnings management. We measure firm size by the 
natural logarithm of total assets.  
Leverage: According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), the more a firm with a high debt ratio, the more likely 
managers are involved with earnings management practices. In order to limit the risk of a transfer of wealth that 
can be caused to shareholders, creditors choose to incorporate covenants in debt contracts. These covenants are 
expressed in the form of accounting ratios and performance thresholds to meet. Thus, the objective of avoiding 
violations, managers are inclined to manipulate accounting figures to bring up a strong financial position 
(Sweeny, 1994; Jiang et al. 2008). We assume the existence of a positive association between the level of debt 
and the value of discretionary accruals. We measure the level of debt of the firm by the financial debt to total 
assets ratio. 
Growth opportunities: According to the informational perspective of earnings management, companies enjoy 
great growth opportunities using performance management to communicate their private information on their 
investments. Gul et al. (2000) and Chen et al. (2010) show that there is a positive relationship between earnings 
management and growth opportunities to address the information related to future investment opportunities 
asymmetry. We expect then a positive relationship between earnings management and growth opportunities. We 
measure this variable by the "Market-to-book" ratio.  
Firm performance: Previous studies have shown that discretionary accruals are influenced by past and current 
performance of the firm (Kang et al. 1995). Ahmed and Zhou (2000) show that high-performing companies 
manage their earnings to benefit from high firm valuation while firms with low performance are more involved 
in opportunistic earnings management to reduce the visibility of this poor performance. Accordingly, we do not 
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expect the direction of the relationship between earnings management and firm performance. As Kothari et al. 
(2005), we measure firm performance by the return on assets (ROA) calculated by dividing the net income over 
total assets. 
Table 2. Definition and variable measurement 
Variable  Measure 
Dependent variable:  
 
 Discretionary accruals  
 
 
ACC_D 
 
Gross value of discretionary accruals measured by the modified Jones 
model (1995). 
Independent variables: 
 
Variable Compensation 
 
 
BONUS 
 
The value of bonus granted to directors during the year. 
Stock-option 
compensation 
OPTIONS Options possessed by managers/ social capital in terms of the number of 
shares 
G Granted Options GRANTS measured by the Black and Scholes models(1973) 
Option Exercise Exercise The intrinsic value of options exercised  
Firm size Size The logarithm of total assets 
Leverage Lev Financial debt /total assets  
Growth opportunities MTB Market value of equities divided by book value of equities 
Firm performance ROA The ratio of net income to total assets 
 
3.3. Methodology 
We use panel data regression to estimate the effect of CEO compensation on earnings management.  
Moreover, this model will be estimated by considering the gross value of discretionary accruals to capture the 
direction of earnings management (upward or downward). Thus, our regression model is as follows: 
 
ACC_Dit = β0 + β 1 BONUSit + β 2 OPTIONSit + β 3 GRANTSit + β 4 EXERCISEit +           β 5 SIZEit +β 6 MTBit 
+ β 7 LEVit + β 8 ROAit + εit. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics and show that executives receive an average of 29.68 % of their total 
compensation in the form of bonuses. Besides, 46.38 % is the average of the Black & Scholes value of options 
granted during the year, which shows the large use of this type of compensation in French firms. Table 3 also 
shows that the managers realize on average, a proportion of 54.99 % of their total compensation through the 
exercise of their options. As the fraction of options held by directors is 3.37 % with a maximum value of 15%. 
Table 3.Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Std deviation Min Max 
Accruals 0.0031 0.0473 -0.2334 0.1747 
Bonus 0.2968 0.210 0.00 0.79 
Options 0.0337 0.026 0.00 0.16 
Grants 0.4638 2.250 0.00 0.73 
Exercice 0.5499 0.64 0.00 2.20 
Size 8.172 2.082 4.50 11.98 
Lev 0.2663 0.1493 0.00 0.73 
MTB 1.9262 1.3201 -1.92 7.03 
ROA 5.8294 7.7211 - 47.20 49.25 
 
To perform the comparison of mean tests, we created a binary variable for earnings management. This variable 
takes the value of 1 for companies that manage their results upwards (ACCD_POS), and 0 for those who manage 
their results downward (ACCD_NEG). We apply the test " Student t " and " Wilcoxon -Mann- Whitney " test. 
Table 4 shows that companies that manage their earnings upwardly, grant more bonuses (32% of total 
compensation ). This is confirmed with both tests at a threshold of 10%. 
As for stock-options, we find that the percentage of options held by directors is significantly higher in the 
positive accrual group than the negative group of companies. The mean differences are significant at the 5% 
level with the Wilcoxon test. Moreover, Table 4 shows that the Black & Scholes value of newly granted options 
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is higher in companies involved in upwardly earnings management. In addition, the intrinsic value of options 
exercised by companies in the positive accruals group is greater than that of options exercised by the negative 
accruals one. 
Table 4. Mean difference tests 
Variables ACCD Mean t-Student z-Wilcoxon 
Bonus 
1 
0 
0.321 
0.270 
1.800
*
 1.980
*
 
Options 
1 
0 
0.035 
0.031 
1.300 -2.245
**
 
Grants 
1 
0 
0.451 
0.387 
1.267 -2.872
**
 
Exercise 
1 
0 
0.638 
0.456 
2.184
**
 -3.831
**
 
Size 
1 
0 
8.190 
8.130 
-0.206 -0.682 
Lev 
1 
0 
0.274 
0.261 
0.559 -0.785 
MTB 
1 
0 
2.396 
0.832 
9.179
***
 -9.631
***
 
ROA   
1 
0 
7.603 
3.505 
4.134
***
 - 4.190
***
 
The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.2. Bivariate analysis 
We check for multicolinearity problem in table 5. According to Gujarati (2004), a serious problem of 
multicolinearity exists when correlations between the independent variables exceed 0.80 which is not the case in 
the present study. For further checks, we display the VIF values. They range between 1.03 and 1.27 by far below 
the critical value of 10 (Neter, Wasserman, and Kunter, 1989). The correlations between the independent 
variables do not seem then to be at the origin of the multicollinearity problem. 
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix 
 Bonus Options Grants Exercise Size Lev MTB 
Bonus 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Options 
 
0.042 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Grants 
 
0.080 
 
0.079 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Exercise  0.215
*** 
 
0.126 
 
0.150
** 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Size 
 
  0.388
***
 
 
-0.014 
 
0.120 
 
0.005 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Lev 
 
0.044 
 
0.051 
 
0.097 
 
0.060 
 
0.150
***
 
 
1 
 
 
 
MTB 
 
-0.037 
 
-0.007 
 
0.043 
 
0.099 
 
-0.488
*** 
 
 -0.031 
 
1 
 
 
ROA 0.067 -0.026 -0.029   0.191
*** 
 0.067
*** 
  -0.070 0.378
***
 
VIF 1,25 1,03 1,06 1,15 1,27 1,05 1,21 
The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
4.3.  Multivariate analysis 
The regression results are presented in Table 6. This table shows that the variable BONUS affects positively and 
significantly at the 5% level earnings management (β1 = 0.032 , z = 2.30). This result confirms our first 
hypothesis that managers receiving bonus plans are using discretionary accruals to increase the variable portion 
of their compensation. This confirms results found by Balsam (1998), and Cheng and Warfield (2005). 
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The positive and significant relationship between the variable executive compensation and earnings management 
confirms the theoretical hypothesis of contractual political theory, related to compensation contracts. Bonus 
schemes are indexed on fir accounting performance. To receive this bonus, managers are more likely to manage 
earnings to increase their bonuses rather than increasing their efforts. 
Moreover, the coefficient associated with the variable OPTIONS is positively and significantly associated with 
earnings management. This implies that the positive discretionary accruals, as a measure of upward earnings 
management, are more pronounced in companies whose managers have a broad portfolio of options. This result 
is in line with those found by previous studies. This result suggests that this compensation type encourage 
managers to engage in practices of accounting manipulation to meet analysts' expectations and maintain share 
high prices shares in a short-term. Considering another measure of accounting manipulations, Burns and Kedia 
(2006) who examine the relationship between restatement and stock-option plans, have also shown that 
restatements of results are observed in firms distributing high levels of stock-options.  
In addition, we find that the association between the intrinsic value of options exercised, and discretionary 
accruals has the expected sign ( β3 = 0.015 , z = 3.20). This finding suggests that earnings are managed upward 
to increase stock prices in periods of their stock-option exercise in order to increase the gain realized from the 
exercise of their stock-options. This positive association confirms our prediction and corroborates the results of 
Bartov and Mohanram (2004), Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). Indeed, this 
result seems to refute the idea that stock-options align the interests of managers and shareholders over the long 
term. 
Table 6 also show that the attribution of new stock-options do not show a significant association between 
earnings management and the value of newly granted options. One possible explanation for this result is that 
managers are more interested in increasing their immediate wealth than that related to future periods. 
Among control variables, firm size is negatively and significantly associated to earnings management. Growth 
opportunities have a positive and significant impact on earnings management. This result confirms the 
informational hypothesis of earnings management which stipulates that companies taking advantage of the great 
investment opportunities use upward earnings management to inform the market about their future investments, 
supporting Gul et al. (2000) et Chen et al. (2010). Moreover, the coefficient on the firm performance measure 
(ROA) is significantly positive at the 1 % level suggesting that managers use upward earnings management to 
enhance firm market value. 
Table 6. Regression results  
  Discretionnary accruals 
 Coeff. t 
Constant 0,0286 (1,85)* 
Bonus 0,032 (2,30)** 
Options 0,422 (3,28)*** 
Grants -0,0011 (-0,9) 
Exercice 0,015 (3,2)*** 
Size -0,003 (-2,1)** 
END -0,01 (-0,41) 
MTB 0,008 (2,96)*** 
ROA 0,002 (4,76)*** 
R² 0,449   
The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.4.  Robustness check  
We address robustness issues by performing a sensitivity analyses. We repeat our estimation using the model of 
Rees et al. (1996), and that of Kothari et al. (2005) as alternative measures of discretionary accruals. The results 
reported in table 7 show that signs and significance levels of our independent variables are slightly not affected. 
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Table 7. Robustness checks 
Discretionary Accruals 
   Rees et al. (1996) Kothari et al. (2005) 
Constant 0.024 -2.00
**
 0.034 1.76
*
 
Bonus 0.032 2.40
***
 0.035 2.60
***
 
Options 0.388 2.98
***
 0.350 2.72
***
 
Grants -0.001 -0.87 -0.0002 -0.19 
Exercise 0.015 3.13
**
 0.015 3.25
***
 
Size -0.003 -1.76
*
 -0.003 - 2.03 
**
 
Lev -0.046 -0.42 -0.010 -0.43 
MTB 0.008 2.91
***
 0.005 2.74
***
 
ROA 0.002 4.71
***
 -0.0001 -0.34 
R² 0,437   0,313   
The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion  
The purpose of this paper was to examine the relationship between pay for performance and earnings 
management by focusing on bonuses and stock-options as the main proportions of CEO compensation.  
Our empirical results first show that managers are inclined to increase the variable part of their compensation by 
engaging in earnings management practices. Furthermore, we find that stock-options would encourage manager 
opportunistic behaviour. Our results show that the amount of stock-options is positively associated to upward 
earnings management practices. In addition, we find a positive relationship between discretionary accruals and 
the exercise of stock options suggesting the desire of managers to increase the added value realized upon 
exercise of their options. 
This research contributes to the literature on managerial compensation and earnings management. Several 
studies have supported the role of performance-based pay in aligning the interests of management and 
shareholders. Our study shows that this compensation type could act contrary to shareholders’ will. Indeed, we 
show that variable compensation and stock-option plans exacerbate manager opportunistic behaviour and 
agency costs rather than acting as a corporate governance device and reducing conflicts of interests. 
However, our research is subject to some limits. A major limitation lies in the method of selection of the sample 
that is not done in a random manner. In fact, our analysis focuses on accounting and financial data of companies 
belonging to the SBF 120 index which makes it difficult to generalize our results to all French companies. Also, 
our choice of stock-options assessment by the method of Black and Scholes can be a source of bias. 
The future availability of quarterly data on stock-options can enrich our analysis by examining the relationship 
between accounting manipulations and political grant / exercise of stock options in the period before / after the 
date of the transaction. Future research may examine the moderating role of corporate governance quality on the 
relationship between executive compensation and earnings management. 
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